In response to the recent migrant and refugee crisis, rich countries have redoubled policy efforts to deter future immigration from poor countries by addressing the "root causes" of migration. We review existing evidence on the effectiveness of such efforts. First, aid disbursements do not generally follow "root causes" rhetoric. The sectoral distribution of aid to migrant-origin countries does not significantly differ from its distribution in other countries. Second, the evidence suggests that aid's capacity to deter migration is small at best. Aid can only encourage economic growth, employment, and security to a limited degree. Beyond this, successful development in almost all formerly-poor countries has produced an increase in emigration. Third, this evidence implies that donors could achieve greater impact by leveraging foreign aid not to deter migration but to shape it for mutual benefit.
Targeting aid toward the 'root causes' of migration
The idea that foreign aid can reduce migration pressures in developing countries has been widespread in policy circles for the past few decades. One of the largest expected bene ts from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was to be an accompanying decrease in 1 migration as economic conditions in Mexico improved. More recently, the U.S. State Department requested additional funds to deal with a surge of Central American child migrants, to "address the underlying factors driving migration or be prepared for what is likely to be an ongoing cyclical phenomenon-with signi cant impact and cost to the United States" (Jacobson 2015, 2) .
Addressing the 'root causes' of migration has also been a main feature of development agencies across Europe since the 1990s. It continues to shape aid policy today (Knoll and Sherri 2017) .
The new European Union Trust Fund for Africa is a cornerstone of the European response to the recent in ux of asylum-seekers from Africa and the Middle East. Such programming often involves signi cant funding to facilitate return migration ows and build 'migration management' capacity in origin countries. This paper focuses solely development aid programming.
What 'root causes', and what types of interventions are used?
What exactly are these 'root causes of migration' and what sorts of aid programming are expected to mitigate them? The EU Trust Fund mentioned above focuses on four key policy areas: employment creation, speci cally for women and youth; basic local-level service provision; migration management; and governance, especially as regards con ict prevention and including border management. Some speci c programs-such as vocational training, food security, and rule of law capacity building-but many of the program documents rely on broader terms like 'resilience building' and 'migration management' as mentioned above.
It can be di cult to ascertain the types and mandates of speci c projects that fall under these broad umbrellas. The EU Trust Fund Sahel and Lake Chad window has designed a "situation index" designed to characterize individual country contexts along ve axes: food insecurity, con ict risk, irregular migrants, socioeconomic vulnerability, and displaced people (European Commission 2016). But it is unclear whether speci c interventions are meant to be targeted along these lines or if its main role is building situational awareness. Other parts of the EU Trust Fund's work, such as the North Africa window, focus almost exclusively on 'migration management. ' 2 The United States Agency for International Development's Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) has a similar mandate in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, to address the "key factors. . . contributing to the migration of unaccompanied, undocumented minors to the United States" (Meyer and Seelke 2015, 32) . Economic development projects are focused on education, vocational training, and employment. Law and order programming is targeted to border security, anti-tra cking and anti-gang programs, and counternarcotics activities. As with the EU Trust Fund, more granular information is di cult to nd. In general, publicly available information on these projects is relatively high-level; likely only funders and implementing partners are aware of speci c on-the-ground programming.
Do disbursements reflect rhetoric?
It is largely unknown whether governments have incorporated these public statements into aid commitments, and whether disbursements re ect the amount committed. Put simply, countries must rst receive foreign aid for it to have any e ect. Do migrant-sending countries actually receive overall more aid than other countries, and/or is this aid composed of di erent speci c elements re ecting root causes rhetoric? We cannot be sure ex ante that public commitments have translated into on-the-ground expenditures. The 'policy gap' between rhetoric and practice is especially severe for migration policy (Czaika and de Haas 2013) . For example, the nal version of the Central America assistance bill referenced above approved only about 50% of the budget request. The literature on whether aid expenditures re ect 'root causes' rhetoric is slim.
Disentangling the complicated rationale behind aid disbursements is not simple, and falls outside the scope of this paper. A large literature has assessed the motivations of foreign aid provision, typically juxtaposing donor self-interest with recipient development need. A small subset therein has highlighted two major mechanisms through which increased migration ows to a speci c donor country could impact ensuing foreign aid spending decisions: rst, the desire to limit future immigration by reducing migration drivers (the main focus of this paper) and second, successful lobbying by the local diaspora to support their home country.
In general, this limited literature supports the premise that important immigrant origin countries receive more foreign aid. Bermeo and Leblang (2015) nd that for the median origin country in their panel, each additional migrant that arrives in the OECD is associated with a US$242 increase in the origin's foreign aid receipts. They nd evidence in support of both mechanisms above. Vazquez and Sobrao (2016) take on the case of Spain, nding that a one percent increase in the immigrant population from a particular origin country is associated with an 18% increase in the probability of being a Spanish aid recipient, and a 0.05% increase in the amount of Spanish ODA (Overseas Development Assistance) received. Czaika and Mayer (2011) investigate the di erential impacts of asylum-seeker and refugee ows on aid expenditures, hypothesizing that donor state response will vary depending on immigrant legal status. In line with migration deterrence priorities, external (cross-border) movements provoke larger aid responses than internal displacement. When aid is distributed to address refugee populations overseas, it is mainly directed to countries of origin rather than countries of rst asylum. Finally, asylum-seekers-who physically arrive at the borders of Western donor countries-stimulate the greatest aid response yet. The authors identify Norway, Austria, and the United States as countries with a particularly "strong migration-sensitive aid allocation" (Czaika and Mayer 2011, 462) .
All of the above analyses consider only aggregate aid disbursements, which have limitations in assessing aid focused on speci c sectors. A central tenet of 'root causes' rhetoric is the importance of targeting aid to the development sectors most relevant to migration motivations. Therefore, research needs to move beyond overall aid numbers to understand the mechanisms behind this programming. A few papers nd at least some support for the premise that aid 'baskets' in general-outside the 'root causes' context-do vary across aid recipient countries based on donor priorities and perceptions (Thiele et al. 2007 , Nielsen 2010 , Bermeo 2016 ).
But to our knowledge, no study has taken a similarly granular approach to assessing aid targeted at ameliorating the root causes of migration. As a preliminary approach to this question, we compile an index of 'migration-relevant' aid, drawing on speci c program types detailed for both the EU Trust Fund and the 1990 report of the US Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development (notably entitled "Unauthorized Migration:
An Economic Development Response"). These interventions include vocational training, small and medium enterprise support, agricultural development, environmental preservation, urban development, food aid, and disaster preparedness e orts. Figure 1 shows the average fraction of total development aid allocated to this 'root causes' programming across ve di erent groups: all aid recipients, top origin countries of asylum-seekers in Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor countries in absolute terms, top origin countries of asylum-seekers in DAC donor countries relative to origin country population, top origin countries of the total migrant stock in DAC donor countries in absolute terms, and top origin countries of the total migrant stock in DAC donor countries relative to origin country population. 2 The bars extending above and below each average show the 95% con dence interval on the estimated mean.
This simple and broad assessment o ers no clear evidence that aid targeted at reducing the root causes of migration is distributed systematically di erently across these di erent groups, especially compared to the global average. In other words, aid targeted for sectors viewed as 'migration-relevant' does not appear to ow in larger measure to countries viewed as 'migrationrelevant'. Further research might add nuance to this portrait, but even these broad comparisons o er reason to doubt the existence of a worldwide wave of 'root causes' aid to the countries where migration is of most concern to donors.
The effect of aid on conditions in migrant-origin countries
To deter migration, aid must not only target development outcomes that could shape migration in principle. Aid must also substantially a ect those outcomes. These e ects could include contributing to the long-run growth of the economy, creating youth employment, and reducing con ict. The literature assessing aid's e ects on these outcomes is extensive. We will not summarize it. Rather, we will ask: Does the aid e ectiveness literature o er clear evidence that aid (if disbursed accordingly) can a ect conditions in migrant-origin countries to a degree that is su cient to deter migration? Here we focus on four plausibly desired outcomes mentioned above: overall economic growth, job creation for youth, con ict resolution, and human rights.
We expect that other aid sectors would demonstrate similar trends.
First, simply assume that aid can increase economic growth. This allows us to ask how long it would likely take for aid to deter emigration by this channel. The exercise is shown in Figure 2 . 3 As we will examine in the next section, various studies have found little systematic deterrent e ect of economic growth on emigration until poor countries reach roughly PPP$8,000-10,000 in GDP per capita (Berthélemy et al. 2009; Clemens 2014; Dao et al. 2016; OECD 2017, 118) .
The gure shows that today's poorest quintile of countries, if they continued to grow at their historical rate of growth (over the last 24 years), would only reach PPP$8,000 in the year 2198.
If foreign aid could systematically raise their economic growth by one percentage point every year-more than a doubling of the historical rate-it would take until the year 2097. If aid could raise growth by two percentage points-a tripling-it would take until the year 2067.
And can foreign aid typically raise growth by these one or two percentage points, in a large group of the poorest countries over generations? This is far from well-established. The research literature has not settled on a consensus that past foreign aid has had any positive growth impact on average (Qian 2015) . Many rigorous studies fail to detect any growth e ect of aid. Ignore this controversy for a moment and consider the magnitude of the e ect, even in the literature that does nd a positive impact. For example Clemens et al. (2012) nd that raising growth by 1 percentage point per year in the average recipient would require on the order of 10% of GDP in aid.
That is much higher than any amounts of aid currently contemplated with the goal of deterring migration; for example, USAID's Central American Regional Security Initiative dedicated 0.2% of GDP to economic growth programming explicitly intended to reduce violence driving migration in El Salvador in 2015 (Washington O ce on Latin America 2017). And according to the exercise above, even that high level of growth would need to be sustained for three generations (until 2097) before it would even begin to deter emigration from the average poor country. 4 The research literature similarly invites skepticism about the ability of foreign aid to cause large changes in youth employment. McKenzie (2017, 20) reviews existing research on poor-country governments' active labor market policies-e orts to increase both the number and quality of jobs. He nds that this research "shows these policies to generally be far less e ective than policy makers, program participants, and economists typically expect. " There is no indication that active labor market policies supported by aid are typically more e ective than those that are not. The least-successful programs have focused on job-training and matching; the most successful programs have assisted rms in overcoming regulatory barriers to hiring and assisted workers in leaving geographic areas where employment is scarce for more promising domestic destinations. There are exceptional cases where intensive job-training through the best training centers has been found to substantially reduce youth unemployment (e.g. Alfonsi et al. 2017) .
But in no case has active labor market policy been shown capable of large reductions in youth unemployment at scale (Fox and Kaul 2017) .
Moreover, the literature to date o ers scant hope that foreign aid can be an important tool to mitigate civil con ict that sparks emigration. Zürcher (2017) reviews all 19 existing studies on this topic that deploy some strategy for causal identi cation-including single-country studies (in such varied contexts as Afghanistan and Colombia) and cross-country studies. He concludes, "The evidence for a violence-dampening e ect of aid in con ict zones is not strong. Aid in conict zones is more likely to exacerbate violence than to dampen violence. A violence-dampening e ect of aid appears to be conditional on a relatively secure environment for aid projects to be implemented. " This is true of all six types of aid-funded interventions he investigates-including conditional cash transfers, humanitarian assistance, and employment promotion. More research is needed; it may be that aid protects relatively stable regions from slipping into con ict, even if it not frequently successful in mitigating ongoing con ict.
Finally, while there is some evidence that foreign aid can have a positive e ect on human rights and democracy, even that e ect is small and dissipates quickly (Carnegie and Marinov 2017) .
The literature does not o er evidence that foreign aid can cause large, sustained improvements in human rights and democracy systematically across numerous migrant-origin countries.
None of this implies that aid cannot a ect conditions in poor countries that spur migration, in any measure. Evaluations of aid e ectiveness are retrospective, their results conditional on how aid was given in the past. Chandy et al. (2017) identify several ways for aid in fragile states to be more e ective, including shifting from bilateral funding and fragmented projects toward multilateral agreements and programmatic assistance. But the evidence to date does carry one clear implication. The underlying rationale of 'root causes' aid programming relies on claims that the magnitude of aid's e ect in speci c sectors is su cient to greatly reduce emigration. Such claims have not met this burden of proof. The evidence we have implies that aid would need to act in unprecedented ways, at much higher levels of funding, over generations, to greatly a ect some of the most important plausible drivers of emigration. That implies a case for experimentation and patience, but not con dence in a surge of aid to end a crisis.
The effect of development on migration
Even if we knew that aid greatly a ected outcomes that theoretically drive increased emigration, we would still need evidence that those outcomes do in fact drive migration behavior. A helpful starting point is to understand two critical ways that many people in poor countries use migration to improve their economic lives: investment and insurance (Banerjee and Du o 2011, 142, 231) .
Sustained economic development tends to encourage emigration
First, poor families use migration as an investment. Among other things, migration is an exchange of substantial up-front costs for a stream of future bene ts (Schultz 1972, 4; Burda 1995; de Haas 2010) . The costs include not just the direct costs of moving but foregone earnings at home and missed interactions with family. The bene ts typically include large but delayed increases in income both for migrants (Clemens et al. 2016) and their families (Gibson and McKenzie 2014; Mergo 2016 ).
This immediately suggests that the e ect of development on migration can be complex, for the same reasons that development has complex e ects on other kinds of investment. For example, greater economic opportunity for people without a college degree might reduce the need for workers to invest in college education, but also increases their means to invest in college education. For similar reasons, greater economic opportunity at home might reduce the incentive for workers to invest in migrating abroad for work, but also increases their ability to make that investment. Which of these forces dominates is an empirical question.
It is now clear that emigration rates in middle-income countries are typically much higher than in poor countries (de Haas 2007; Clemens 2014; Dao et al. 2016; OECD 2017, 118) . Economic development has also been positively associated with major asylum-seeker out ows over the medium and long term (Rotte et al. 1997; Vogler and Rotte 2000) . Additional disposable income causes many poor families to invest it in more migration (e.g. Angelucci 2015; Bazzi 2017 ).
This suggests that in poor countries, development does more to encourage migration than to deter it. Figure 3a shows this relationship for the year 2013. 5 Countries with GDP per capita of US$5,000-10,000 at purchasing power parity have, on average, roughly triple the emigrant stock of countries below US$2,000. Here, 'emigrant stock' refers to the number of people born in a country but living outside it, divided by the population of the origin country. Only in countries above US$10,000 is there a clear negative relationship between real GDP per capita and emigrant stocks. This tendency for emigration to rst rise and then fall with rising GDP per capita was rst termed the 'mobility transition' (Zelinsky 1971 ).
This pattern is counterintuitive for many who rst encounter the evidence. The most basic economic theories of migration imply that greater economic opportunity at home will reduce the incentive and thus the tendency to emigrate, all else equal (Sjaastad 1962) . But all else is not equal.
As development proceeds, human capital accumulates, connections to international networks increase, fertility shifts, aspirations rise, and credit constraints are eased. All of these changes tend to raise emigration. The most important of these factors appear to be rising education levels and international connections, which both inspire and facilitate emigration (Dao et al. 2016 ). Economic development is also often accompanied by falling child mortality rates while fertility rates are still high, leading to a surge in the number of young workers who have a high tendency to migrate. Greater disposable income means greater ability to pay the direct costs of migration, but also greater ability to invest in things that both inspire and facilitate migrationsuch as Internet access, language skills, overseas business connections, and overseas tourism. Does the positive relationship between development and migration in poor countries accurately describe the e ect of development on migration? One possible concern about the evidence in Figure 3a is that it shows a cross-sectional relationship at a single moment in time. In principle, this correlation could conceal parts of the causal relationship. It could conceal long-term e ects of economic growth on migration by only showing a short-term relationship. It could also conceal unobserved traits of today's low-income countries that might cause them to follow a di erent path than today's middle-income countries did.
But the data do not support either of these possibilities. Figure 3b shows In other words, the path followed by individual countries over time has resembled the crosssectional relationship. As poor countries have become rich, almost all have experienced large migration out ows. Rising real incomes at home have gone hand in hand with higher levels of emigration.
A second possible concern about this evidence is that even if emigration rises with future economic development, emigration might fall with future improvements in non-economic development indicators. For example, better health conditions in poor countries or greater opportunities to internally migrate to urban areas could in principle substitute for international migration. But the evidence reveals no such patterns. Figure 4a shows the cross-country relationship between emigration and child survival-the probability that any given newborn lives to age ve. 7 People have a sharply greater tendency to emigrate from countries where children are less likely to die. This is likely because child mortality rates typically fall well before fertility rates fall. So typical countries must proceed quite far through the demographic transition before migration pressure from young workers abates (Figure 4b ). And there is no statistically signi cant di erence between emigration rates in high-urbanization countries versus low-urbanization countries 6 There are 109 countries with reliable data on both emigrant stock and Purchasing Power Parity adjusted GDP per capita, in both 1960 and 2013, and 71 of these were above PPP$5,000 in GDP per capita in the year 2013.
7 All development indicator data from the World Bank World Development Indicators; migration data from the United Nations Global Migration Database. (Figure 4c ). In short, there is little sign that emigration is lower in poor countries with generally better public health or generally greater access to urban living, and little reason to believe that changes in such indicators will broadly and systematically deter emigration.
This evidence strongly suggests that in poor countries, development facilitates investment in emigration much more than it deters investment in emigration. But investment is only one way in which poor families use migration.
Greater short-term income diversification tends to discourage emigration
Poor families also use migration as a form of insurance. It helps them to diversify income across members of the household, making the family less vulnerable to shocks like job loss or sudden sickness. Migration also helps diversify income over time, reducing the risk of dire lean periods for the whole household (Chen et al. 2003; Giesbert 2007; Shonchoy 2011; Marchetta 2013;  Bignebat and Sakho-Jimbira 2013; Bryan et al. 2014 ).
This too suggests that the e ect of greater economic development on migration decisions can be complex. More stable and predictable economies can reduce the need to insure against negative shocks, but as aspirations rise, so can the need for insurance. For example, a family of subsistence agriculturists may perceive less harm from pulling a child out of sixth grade to work due to a parent's job loss than would a middle-class family forced to withdraw their most capable child from 12 th grade for the same reason. Beyond this, as above, greater prosperity can also raise poor families' ability to access the insurance bene ts of migration. The net e ect of greater prosperity on migration by this channel, too, is ambiguous in principle.
The youth employment rate is a sound, general guide to the probability that any given young person can supplement household income through wage work. And the data show us an unmistakable negative relationship between emigration rates and youth employment. In countries where youth employment exceeds 90%, the emigration rate is half as large as in countries where youth employment is just 70% (Figure 5a ). 8 This trend is evident not just among poor coun-tries but across all countries. When youth employment is very low (40-70%), countries with marginally higher youth employment do not exhibit lower emigration rates. In countries where youth employment stagnates below 70%, marginal increases in job opportunities may both stimulate demand for the insurance of international migration and reduce that demand, to o setting degrees. At higher rates of youth employment the migration-deterring e ect appears, on average, to win out.
But it would be inadequate to infer that successful assistance for youth job creation will clearly deter emigration. This is because the greatest engine of youth job creation is economic growth, which in poor countries tends to raise emigration. Figure 5b shows the same relationship in Figure 5a separately for countries in the two lowest quartiles of GDP per capita. For both the poorest quartile (below PPP$3,954) and the second quartile (between PPP$3,954 and $11,717), there is a clear negative relationship between youth employment and emigration. But at any given level of youth employment, emigration is much higher for relatively richer countries. The graph shows that countries in the richer quartile with 90% youth employment (e.g. Paraguay) have similar emigration rates to countries in the poorer quartile with 60% youth employment (e.g. Mozambique).
In other words, the evidence suggests that emigration is lower at higher levels of youth employment for any given level of overall economic development. Assisting families to diversify their incomes with domestic wage work may substantially reduce migration rates in poor countries that remain poor. But it may not do so in robustly growing and diversifying economies. This has important implications for policymakers, to be discussed in the nal section.
The overall effect of aid on emigration
The evidence so far urges caution in interpreting any retrospective empirical estimate of the e ect of aid on migration. The mechanism by which aid could systematically deter migration is left unclear. We do not have strong evidence that aid has typically been targeted to the sectors or places that most obviously would a ect emigration. The ability of aid to cause large, short-term changes in national income, employment, or security is not independently demonstrated. And overall development-better incomes, health, and education-is in fact strongly associated with rising emigration. All of these suggest that, as we review the small literature directly testing the overall e ect of aid on migration, we should not have a strong prior that it will detect substantial deterrence of migration by aid.
The rst systematic quantitative assessment of the global average e ect of aid on emigration is the gravity model in Berthélemy et al. (2009) . They nd that aid raises net emigration from the average poor country to high-income OECD countries: When aid rises by 10% of GDP this raises the average emigrant stock as a share of population by 1.5 percentage points. They also nd that aid shifts the composition of emigration toward low-skill migrants, and that the share of bilateral aid raises emigration about twice as much as aggregate aid.
One complication in interpreting these results, a complication common to many cross-country ndings, is the possibility of overcontrolling-that is, holding portions of the relevant causal pathway constant. The regressions used by Berthélemy et al. (2009) control for the aid recipient's GDP per capita, population, and trade with the migrant destination country. This is a sensible empirical choice because all of these factors can a ect migration independently of aid. But it has the drawback that all of these factors can likewise form part of the causal pathway from aid to migration. Thus the coe cient estimates on aid itself show the relationship between aid and migration other than any e ects that aid might have via any e ects on economic growth, population growth, or trade. In principle, aid could a ect these other factors in ways that reduce migration, or increase it even more.
The broad nding of Berthélemy et al. has been challenged by a small, recent literature. Lanati and Thiele (2017) , also in a gravity model, nd no e ect of bilateral aid on migration, and a negative e ect of aggregate aid on migration. 9 The principal innovation is the use of panel data, allowing xed e ects by origin (and destination). These results are di cult to compare with those of Berthélemy et al., because Lanati and Thiele use a di erent migration variable (gross migration ows annually 1995-2014 rather than net migration stocks in 2000), a di erent treatment variable (net aid ows rather than gross aid), a di erent set of countries (28 rather than 22 destination countries), and greatly di erent regression speci cations. One example of how this complicates any comparison: Aid could decrease outmigration but also decrease return migration, such that a negative e ect on gross migration is not incompatible with a positive e ect on net migration. Given that Lanati and Thiele (2017) Related challenges are faced by the two other cross-country studies of which we are aware, both of which nd limited deterrence of migration by aid. Gamso and Yuldashev (2017) nd, in a 25-year panel with country xed-e ects, that aid supporting 'governance' (such as 'legal and judicial development' and 'public sector policy and administrative management') reduces emigration, but no other type of aid does so. This is only about a tenth of all aid (Gamso and Yuldashev 2017, Table 5 ). In particular, they nd that aid intended to stimulate economic activity does not a ect migration. This result is di cult to compare with the other results above because Gamso and Yuldashev do not test the e ects of aggregate aid. Murat (2017) similarly nds no e ect of bilateral aid on overall migration, though a negative e ect of bilateral aid on bilateral refugee ows in particular. All of the speci cations in both of these analyses similarly su er from possible overcontrolling as described above, making all coe cient estimates di cult to interpret.
In sum, the few cross-country studies testing the overall relationship between aid and migration fail to o er clear evidence that aid has substantially deterred migration on average. The only study to date published in a peer-reviewed journal nds that aid typically raises emigration.
Very recent work has either found no e ect on overall migration from the large share of aid that is bilateral (Lanati and Thiele 2017; Murat 2017) , or no e ect from the vast majority of both bilateral and multilateral aid that is not directed toward governance quality (Gamso and Yuldashev 2017) . All of the studies face important challenges in interpreting the coe cient estimates on aid as the policy impact of an increase in aid, all else equal, since all control for several country characteristics that could be changed by an increase in aid. This literature does suggest several interesting questions: For example, if the e ect of multilateral aid really is di erent from bilateral aid, is this because multilateral aid is more e ective or because bilateral aid builds bilateral ties that foster migration?
But the literature as it stands does not o er strong evidence that aid has systematically deterred migration, and rather implies that aid may have encouraged migration. As we emphasized at the beginning of this section, the literature testing for overall e ects has a substantial burden of proof to bear because the evidence for each step in the underlying causal mechanism is itself weak. This literature does not yet o er lessons that would be programmatically useful for aid planners interested in deterring migration. A promising way forward is to seek large exogenous changes or discontinuities in aid exposure-such as across time, networks, cohorts, or areas-to look for well-identi ed e ects on migration.
Four lessons
Today the evidence that aid can greatly and sustainably deter emigration from poor countries is weak at best. Aid tends to follow geopolitical concerns (Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Faye and Niehaus 2012) and there is minimal evidence that it has systematically targeted the geographic areas or sectors considered most in uential for migration ows. Aid ows may have a positive e ect on economic growth-though this remains controversial-but more importantly, economic growth has historically raised emigration in almost all developing countries. Large increases in youth employment may well deter emigration in the short term, in countries that remain poor, but the best evaluation evidence nds most donor projects have had little success creating youth employment at large scale.
Aid practitioners' most common questions of such research are operational: Where, when, and what kind of aid should they give to best serve their obvious implicit mandate to deter migration?
But the scant empirical research literature does not allow general operational lessons of this kind.
We draw four lessons for aid policymakers and researchers with an interest in a ecting migration ows from poor countries.
First, the evidence suggests that aid-supported programs to increase employment of young workers, in both rural and urban areas, can modestly reduce the potential for surges of emigration in the short term. We qualify this assessment with 'modestly' because most such e orts have failed to achieve large changes in youth employment at scale. We qualify it with 'rural and urban' because there is no clear evidence that poor countries with more urban or more rural populations have di erent emigration rates. And we qualify it with 'short term' because the principal generator of youth employment-economic growth-tends to raise emigration in the medium and long term. Among countries that remain poor but manage to get more youths into jobs, migration rates are likely to fall somewhat. But in countries that get more youths into jobs sustainably, by developing a dynamic and growing economy, the typical net e ect is likely to be an increase in migration.
This implies a reasonable aspiration for aid seeking to deter migration: to help at the margin to get youths into predictable jobs, shielding their families from shocks and mitigating sudden surges of migration-during the decades that emigration steadily rises along with development.
Although some aid projects have sought to go further, especially by mitigating migration pressures arising from con ict, the literature o ers little evidence that aid to mitigate existing civil con ict has typically done so.
Second, greater transparency and reporting is necessary to understand this phenomenon. The public documentation available on aid programming is too high-level to help researchers and 16 other policymakers understand how these projects actually play out on the ground. A good rst step would be to follow the precedent set by OECD Creditor Monitoring System reporting of aid projects targeting environmental and gender inequality. Tracking these aid e orts is necessary to inform both impact evaluation and any future programming.
Third, policy and research should focus on diverse experimentation in local context, continuously modi ed by feedback from rigorous evaluation. This approach has been called ProblemDriven Iterative Adaption (Andrews et al. 2013) . While more could be learned from re nements of cross-country regressions, that research program is unlikely to result in reliable guides to donors seeking to deter migration in a given setting. Carefully evaluating the impact of new aid e orts on international migration requires counterfactuals-places, cohorts, networks, or time periods with less or no exposure to the aid intervention, but otherwise similar, for comparison.
And it requires tracking a ected families to determine if they have gone abroad. Particularly important is testing a diverse range of new policies to raise youth employment, given the very poor track record of most past e orts. Research facilities created under the European Union Trust Fund for Africa o er an excellent opportunity for new research of this kind-combining diverse experimentation with counterfactuals and migrant tracking-an opportunity that remains to be seized.
Fourth, aid seeking to shape migration must look far beyond e orts to deter migration. Demographic realities imply that large-scale migration will occur in some form. Most notably, these realities include estimates of the net increase of 800 million workers in sub-Saharan Africa by the year 2050, at a time when populations in many migrant-destination countries are aging and stagnating (Hanson and McIntosh 2016) . The true demographic surge to come may be even larger (Bertoli 2017) . The evidence reviewed here does not o er strong reasons to believe that a large portion of those future ows can be deterred with aid policy, and the literature suggests a limited role for deterring them with interdiction (e.g. Gathmann 2008; Czaika and Haas 2017) .
Instead, aid agencies seeking to shape future migration ows can focus on cooperation with migrant-origin countries that alters how migration occurs, maximizing its potential bene ts for everyone involved. Aid agencies can work with migrant-origin countries to develop safe, lawful, and mutually bene cial channels for lower-skill labor mobility (Gibson and McKenzie 2014; Clemens and Postel 2017) . Foreign assistance is often required for up-front costs like providing identity documents to potential migrants, developing systems to monitor and enforce labor recruitment laws, and agencies to monitor returns and prevent overstays. Such activities do not substitute for more traditional aid, but complement it. For example, the local economic stimulus of remittances would tend to raise demand for the produce of any aid-supported farms or small businesses (Minasyan and Nunnenkamp 2016) .
Aid agencies can also shape higher-skill migration for mutual bene t, such as facilitating nance and technology transfers to equitably share the training costs of skilled migrants, and strengthening origin-country training institutions to give migrants precisely the skills they need for rapid employment and integration at the destination (Clemens 2015; Clemens et al. 2015) . This eld is wide open for innovation. For example, none of the projects currently supported by the EU Trust Fund for Africa have the goal of creating mutually bene cial labor mobility channels between Africa and the rest of the world. Current aid e orts around the world have devoted essentially none of their portfolio to supporting innovative ways to shape rather than deter migration. The rst step in seizing this historic opportunity would be a substantial shift in aid agencies' new mandate-away from an exclusive focus on deterring migration and toward shaping migration for mutual bene t. Vertical axis shows fraction of aid in 2015 targeted to migration-relevant sectors including vocational training, small and medium enterprise support, agricultural development, environmental preservation, urban development, food aid, and disaster preparedness. Unit of analysis is recipient country. The rst column shows the average fraction for all aid recipients, with a 95% con dence interval on the estimated mean fraction. The second column shows the same fraction for the ten countries that were the origins of the largest absolute numbers of asylum-seeker ows to DAC donor countries in 2015. The third column shows the ten aid recipient countries that were the origins of the largest asylum seeker ows to DAC donor countries relative to the origin-country population in 2015. The fourth column shows the ten countries with the largest emigrant stocks residing in DAC donor countries in absolute numbers-where emigrant is de ned as any person born in that country who lives in a DAC donor country. The fth column shows the ten countries with the largest emigrant stocks in DAC donor countries as a fraction of the origin-country population. Cross-country relationships for a single year (2013), using all countries on earth with available data. Horizontal axis for child survival, whose distribution across countries exhibits high skewness, shown under zero-skewness hyperbolic transformation (Tsai et al. 2017 Part (a) shows the cross-country relationship in 2013 for all countries on earth with available data (excluding Macau), and dashed lines show 95% con dence interval in local linear regression with Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth 0.2 log points. Horizontal axis for youth employment, whose distribution across countries exhibits high skewness, shown under zero-skewness hyperbolic transformation (Tsai et al. 2017) : −l n(−x + 1.049538). Part (b) shows cross-country relationship separately for countries in lowest quartile of income per capita (<PPP$3,954) and second quartile ( PPP$3, 954 and <PPP$11, 717) . Local linear regression with Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth 0.3 log points.
